Abstract: Remittance networks built through transnational migration have transformed local economies as well as social lives in many parts of the world. In this article,
and sometimes impossible, why did young men like Alimou and Lamarana insist that only the promise of making money kept them away from the Fouta Djallon, where they otherwise wanted to be? Would they truly have preferred to stay home, had economic necessity not driven them away? Likewise, how did their parents, siblings, wives, and friends back in Guinea manage their daily lives without much income, either in remittances or from their own earnings? Could they really, as Alimou declared, "eat without paying"? If money is the "key to the world," why would possessing it motivate someone not to travel the world, but rather to stay home, as Lamarana suggested?
In this article, I illustrate that the answers to these questions lie in understanding how particular notions of personhood infuse practices of migration, work, and money-earning for people in a transnational remittance economy. I argue that Fouta Djallon migrants embark on their journeys abroad against seemingly impossible odds not only to earn and send home money but also in quest of social personhood-a desire they share with their family members who stay behind and endeavor not to appear "useless" by engaging in small, often unprofitable, business projects. I show that when the experiences of migrants are examined in juxtaposition with the economic activities undertaken by people in migrant-sending communities, the importance of social personhood for all individuals becomes clearly evident. Beyond aspirations of making money, going abroad allows migrants to present themselves as striving to be responsible members of the communities they leave behind-even if the reality of their experiences leaves their ideals of personal success unfulfilled. Likewise, individuals who stay in their hometowns and engage in small-scale entrepreneurial activities that earn almost no money at all are performing a similar notion of responsible personhood. People desire wealth, but they rarely respectable personhood in a context where global structural inequalities and increased policing of international borders make acquiring the material trappings of a successful life difficult, if not impossible.
Notions of personhood are especially salient in contexts of transnational migration, where conceptions of what makes a proper person reflect differences in perspective within migrant groups, as well as between them and host country nationals (Green 2011) . Anthropological studies of migration have shown that migrants who are able to send remittances gain status and recognition in their hometowns, as well as in associations of fellow expatriates in their countries of residence (Trager 2001 , Riccio 2011 . And though aspiring migrants are often motivated by economic need, they may also desire to participate more fully in a globalized world where they see mobility as synonymous with modernity (Mains 2007 , Lindquist 2009 , Chu 2010 . This article contributes to these literatures on personhood and migration, first, by showing how migrants strive to achieve recognition as responsible adult persons even when they are unable to send much, or any, money. And second, I show how particular ideals of successful personhood connect migrants who leave home to seek their fortunes with their family members who, in staying home, occupy their time with business projects that stand little chance of making money.
This article also contributes to anthropological work on youth transitions to adulthood in contexts of economic uncertainty. A number of studies, particularly those focusing on the experiences young men, have illustrated how boredom and waiting for opportunities that never materialize induce frustration and a sense of helplessness at being trapped in apparent limbo between youth and social adulthood. And yet, widespread unemployment and dispossession may also be productive of new political engagements, social connections, and cultural practices for those who are left with an overabundance of time and little else (Mains 2007 , Jeffrey 2010 , Masquelier 2013 . In contexts where social adulthood is achieved largely through marriage and children, earning enough money to support a family and build a house is critical to becoming recognized as an adult person (Hansen 2005 , Coulter 2009 ). In many cases, confronted with a dearth of formal sector employment, yet wanting to survive and also partake in cosmopolitan consumption, youth turn to independent entrepreneurship to participate in the global neoliberal economy (Scheld 2007 , Martin-Iverson 2012 . Here, I demonstrate how ideals of proper adult personhood motivate the entrepreneurial efforts of both migrants and non-migrants to earn money, or to appear to be trying to earn money. 3 This deep history of mobility, reshaped and accelerated during an era of socialist state repression when between one quarter and one third of all Guineans left the country , has contributed to many Fouta Djallon residents' conceptions of themselves as people who move-which in turn figure in idealized notions of Fulɓe He shared a small room and a bed with three cousins around his own age, all in similar situations. To understand why Alimou considered that striving to make money abroad was worthwhile despite the many challenges involved, it is necessary to consider the broader social meanings, expectations, and motivations that shaped his individual search for success.
In what follows, I first examine the concept of remittances. I argue that focusing on remittances, in isolation from other forms of monetary or material gifts and exchange, is, first, virtually impossible in many contexts; and second, such a focus overlooks the significance of shared ambitions, desires, and notions of personal responsibility that link communities of people between small villages and larger cities, in home countries and abroad. I then examine the process of desiring and working toward a départ-the financial start in life that migrants told me they wanted-and how this aspiration fits in with other major life goals that mark the path toward responsible personhood. Subsequently, I present examples of the barely profitable economic activities pursued by those remaining in Guinea. Examining small business efforts as not strictly economic activities but also as social engagements, I analyze informants' critiques of "uselessness" to explain why individuals so often commit themselves to entrepreneurial projects that may seem economically irrational. Desiring to "leave a trace" in the world by building a house and parenting children, Fouta Djallon residents and migrants alike seek to achieve both wealth and responsible personhood. 2011 :222, Ratha et al. 2011 :5, 51, World Bank 2011 . This is especially the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, where "only about half of the countries…collect remittance data with any regularity, and some major receivers of remittances report no data at all" (Ratha et al. 2011:5) .
Remittances everywhere and nowhere
The disjuncture between remittances as conducive to national development, on the one hand, and as shadowy unknowns, on the other, reveals how remittances may be politically or economically constructed in different ways. Rather than accepting the category of remittances at face value, I
build on anthropological analyses that interrogate the meanings and conceptual boundaries of remittances and other forms of monetary obligation and responsibility in social contexts. Hernandez and Coutin (2006) have argued that "expert" discourse serves to produce and define remittances as a measurable category. Situated at a "strange intersection of neoliberal economic strategies and grass-roots empowerment efforts," remittance discourse relies on particular accounting-or "discounting"-practices that represent remittances as cost-free national income, regardless of migrants' individual sacrifices or suffering (Hernandez and Coutin 2006:186) . Money earned and sent by individuals, often at great personal cost to both migrants and their non-migrant families and with no assistance from any government, becomes the focal point of nation-states' efforts to harness transnational populations for political support or investment in national development (Baker-Cristales 2008 , Mohan 2008 . And yet, since "development" may have different meanings in different contexts, a community's use of remittances may not coincide with national or international ideals (Grigolini 2005 , Trager 2001 African CFA francs circulated widely, and could be exchanged for Guinea francs even in smalltown shops. As the weeks and months passed, I developed other, more circuitous ways of asking informants when and how they received money from family members living outside of Guinea.
But I also realized that remittances in the Fouta Djallon were often indistinguishable from other enactments of social obligations and reciprocity, motivated by individual desire as well as social expectation.
Anthropological studies of migration have consistently shown that remittances reflect the broader social lives of people who send and receive them. Beyond supplying people with often badly needed money, remittances also create social ties and solidarity between groups of people around the world (Cohen 2011 , Monsutti 2005 . Anthropologists have taken remittances as the starting point for understanding questions of family, marriage, and gender in transnational relationships (Åkesson 2011 , Lubkemann 2005 , McKay 2007 , Pauli 2008 . In some instances, even seemingly insignificant sums of money and small gifts can go a long way toward maintaining reciprocal kinship and social ties that ultimately provide migrants with the option to move back home when they become too old to work (Cliggett 2003) . As money that moves between people, remittances lend themselves to analysis of social ties created and maintained when people feel themselves obligated to give, receive, and reciprocate (cf. Mauss 1990) . And yet, though a focus on remittances may be illuminating in some contexts, in others-such as the personhood. The trope of a young man going off to seek his fortune in order to return and win a bride loomed large in the Fouta Djallon. However, the cost a young man faced in getting married was significant, including the bride-price (formerly given in cattle, now usually cash), gifts of money for the bride's friends, sisters, and aunts, new clothes for the bride and other members of the family, and enormous amounts of food for the wedding celebrations. After marriage, either the new wife would number among the people to whom the migrant groom sent money, or else-if her new husband had a room with a bed, which was far more expensive to obtain in Dakar than in Guinea-she would travel abroad to join her husband, who was not required to come home for the wedding ceremony. Ideally, marriage would be followed by the births of children and the construction of a house in the groom's hometown.
These goals of getting married, subsequently having children, and building houses were not unique to migrants: Fulɓe in both Guinea and Senegal spoke of these as required qualifications for anyone to be considered a responsible adult. Building houses and having children were two of the ultimate life achievements that people referred to as "leaving a trace"
(laisser une trace, or accugol batte in Pular). A life lived without leaving behind some sign that a person had been on this earth was essentially a failure. But "leaving a trace" could rarely be accomplished without money, the "key to the world" cited by Lamarana, above. And though some people managed to build successful businesses without ever going abroad, the prevailing notion among Fulɓe was that one could not properly get one's départ if one stayed in Guinea.
Money sent and carried home from abroad had the power and recognition of foreign hard currency, unlike the notoriously weak Guinea franc. As one interviewee put it, One problem with this model was that the cost of living in Europe and North America, and even in places closer to home like Dakar, was far higher than in Guinea. A very basic room in Dakar cost at least 20,000 to 25,000 CFA francs per month in rent-about $40 to $50. In contrast, a similar room in Labe, the largest city in the Fouta Djallon region, might cost 20,000 to 25,000
Guinea francs per month-from $3 to $5, according to the shifting exchange rates during my research period. Dakar rent prices were shocking to some migrants who, if they had ever paid for housing at all, had paid considerably less. The cost of rent, electricity, water, and food could easily consume whatever money migrants managed to earn in a month.
Examples of successful Guinean Fulɓe in Dakar certainly existed. A few prosperous entrepreneurs from the Fouta Djallon ran transnational business empires, constructed multi-story buildings in suburban neighborhoods, and gave their sons and daughters university educations.
(Occasionally, while walking or riding public transport with me through Dakar's neighborhoods, an informant would point to a large building and say, "A Pullo-Fouta owns that. used to know in Hamdallaye who now pretended not to recognize him; he could tell they were ashamed to be seen doing the kind of work they were doing. So he learned that when he passed a man he had once known who was now carrying a container of oil or someone else's baggage on his head, he must look aside and pretend not to see. Though rarely declared as such, failure and shame were common experiences for Fulɓe migrants who found themselves unable to do work they considered respectable, let alone establish a business, and whose attempts to earn money enabled them to do little more than survive.
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Migrants like Alpha Amadou who did work they considered shameful were motivated against seemingly impossible odds by their desire to achieve enough of a fortune to bring them into adult personhood, toward marriage, children, a house, and "leaving a trace." Some people told admiring rags-to-riches stories about notoriously wealthy Fulɓe businessmen who had come from poor families and made their départ through hard work. 9 But the temporality of this scheme was critical. Many young men's willingness to suffer through particularly difficult circumstances abroad was supported by the popular notion that these difficult circumstances were only temporary-that as soon as they had earned enough money to marry and start their own businesses and adult lives back in the Fouta Djallon, they would be able to leave behind the hardship they had endured to achieve their goals. One young man emphasized in an interview that he did not especially want to be in Dakar, and hoped to return to Guinea as soon as he had the means to start a small business there: (Bird and Kendall 1980) . Pular speakers describe migrants as going "to seek" or "to search" (ɗaɓɓugol). "He left to seek," a Fulɓe parent might say of a son who had gone to Senegal or Italy or Angola. "His [and our] fortune" would be the implied object of the search, but so would "his [and our] future." A hero son returned from adventure would see to his parents' comfort, marry a local bride, have children, and build a house-effectively, transition to adult personhood. And yet, at best, the process of leaving these "traces" would likely take many years and multiple return trips. In many cases, as Mamadou Korka asserted in the exchange with which I opened this paper, "people leave Guinea and try for twenty years to make money and they don't succeed." Discussing the hardships experienced by migrants to the Indonesian island of Batam, Johan Lindquist points out that "what is initially imagined as a rite of passage does not necessarily lead to a resolution" (Lindquist 2009:12) . This sentiment would have resonated with many Guinean Fulɓe men in Dakar who after years of striving had yet to get their départ.
Furthermore, though migrants from the Fouta Djallon traveled frequently to Dakar, poststructural adjustment Dakar was less a site of economic opportunity than itself a city of emigration, a transit point from which large numbers of Senegalese, Guineans, and other West Africans sought to move onward to more distant corners of the world-even via clandestine and extremely dangerous fishing boat voyages to Europe (Melly 2011) .
While some young men like Alpha Amadou were unpleasantly surprised at the working conditions they discovered in Dakar, others, like Mamadou Korka, spoke as though success for Guineans abroad were practically impossible. And yet, despite at least a partial awareness of the challenges involved, Fulɓe with few or no resources have continued to leave the Fouta Djallon to seek a départ elsewhere. One elderly woman in Hamdallaye explained the situation bluntly and succinctly:
"What's making people here leave and taking them abroad? The money there is strong. If they go there and make money, they'll come back and exchange it. They'll buy land, they'll build villages, they'll bring cars. This is the main advantage of going. Today, whoever doesn't go abroad will be incapable, useless."
This fearful prospect of being generally regarded as "incapable" (kelɗaa) or "useless" (hittaa) motivated many Guinean Fulɓe, especially men, to seek their fortunes abroad. Migrants faced slim odds of economic success; they might rarely send remittances, and they might experience personal shame from the nature of the work they were obliged to do. But to live life at home without a means of earning any money, and consequently without any means of proving oneself "capable" and of "leaving a trace," meant almost certain failure at becoming a responsible person. And while failure abroad might be hidden from families and communities at home, failure at home happened in full view of the very people to whom one was unable to fulfill one's obligations. Under these circumstances, people who were obliged to stay home often did work that earned little or no money, but that nevertheless demonstrated their responsible personhood to others.
More than just sitting around, but less than earning a living: evading "uselessness" "In Guinea, you'll see young people, maybe fifteen people, twenty people, even thirty people, sitting from seven o'clock in the morning to seven o'clock at night, or even until eight, or nine, or ten, or midnight. They'll be making tea, playing checkers, telling jokes…"
--Guinean Fulɓe man in Dakar, March 2010
Young people in the Fouta Djallon, and indeed throughout many areas of Sahelian West Africa, sometimes enjoy sitting and talking in a group while drinking tea brewed in three rounds from a common pot (cf. Masquelier 2013). This popular social activity, which can take the better part of an afternoon, was a subject of critique among many Fulɓe, as the informant quoted above implies. Whereas this man had embarked on a quest to seek his fortune and his future, those remaining in his hometown were-in his estimation-just sitting around, and not working. The frequent characterization of youth as "just sitting around" (jooɗagol tun) was consistent with a larger collective self-critique that Fouta Djallon residents frequently directed against themselves when comparing Guinea with other postcolonial states they considered more developed. Once, during my research in Hamdallaye, a schoolchild's notebook cover printed with color photographs of Dakar street scenes and the English words "Dakar New Look" became the subject of much admiration among a group of men who were themselves sitting and making tea.
Commenting on the roads and buildings in the photos, the men all discussed how in Senegal, people worked-not like here, in Guinea. Deploying unflattering stereotypes, this rhetoric of "rueful self-recognition" helped bind Fouta Djallon residents together in a kind of "cultural intimacy," while simultaneously blaming them for national problems (Herzfeld 2005) . At the same time, some individuals who found themselves unable to either migrate and send home remittances, or earn a living through work in the Fouta Djallon nevertheless went to significant lengths to demonstrate that they were not "incapable" or "useless." In order to show their families and communities that they were, or were becoming, responsible adult persons, both men and women occupied themselves with entrepreneurial ventures that counted as respectable work, even when their efforts yielded little or no profit. Like Weber's Protestants, people in the Fouta Djallon recognized hard work and striving for economic success as signs of virtue (cf. Weber 2003) . 10 But far from achieving wealth through capitalist accumulation, most individuals working in the Fouta Djallon managed, at best, to forestall allegations of social "uselessness."
For the majority of people in Guinea, as one informant put it, "Fin de mois alaa"-essentially, "there is no payday." Guinean civil servants got paid at the end of the month, but these people were few in comparison with the population as a whole. Even government functionaries and teachers who in principle did receive monthly salaries rarely found their incomes either reliable or sufficient. Salary payments were often delayed, and during periods of national insecurity banks closed for long stretches, the money inside rendered inaccessible. with what a comparable Guinean institution would have paid them-thus much less than that of their expatriate co-workers, and in Guinea francs rather than foreign hard currency. When the exchange rate plummeted, so did their salaries' buying power.
People without salaried jobs, for whom there truly was no payday, managed to get by (se débrouiller, or débrouillugol in the Pular adaptation of the French verb) by patching together a combination of income-generating schemes. Remittances from relatives abroad might regularly or occasionally supplement money earned through local business projects, but people receiving remittances rarely allowed them to replace their entrepreneurial endeavors; instead, people spoke of money sent from migrant relatives as providing them with the means to invest and expand their business efforts. Beginning as teenagers-and sometimes even before-most people in the Fouta Djallon were in the process of figuring out how to make money in conditions that were unpromising at best. But though surviving, let alone prospering, could be difficult, most individuals were not willing to do just any kind of work; if possible, they directed their efforts toward entrepreneurship, in keeping with the notion-sometimes implicit, sometimes stated outright-that Fulɓe were especially skilled in this area. Few people had disposable income of any kind, and profit margins were small. Nevertheless, business was the ideal, much preferred to farming, which some Guinean politicians argued would be more beneficial in developing the country. Some Fouta Djallon residents explained the supposed Fulɓe distaste for agriculture as rooted in the Fulɓe legacy of nomadic pastoralism, though few Fulɓe in Guinea today rely on their animals for their livelihood. Most Fouta Djallon women kept home gardens, multi-cropping cassava, maize, taro, sweet potatoes, peanuts, squash, and other vegetables for home consumption. But large-scale agriculture was associated with lower-status social groups rather than Fulɓe, who preferred commerce. 12 A typical business plan involved opening a small shop to sell items that people bought on a daily basis, like soap, candles, batteries, tomato paste, and tea.
But this kind of venture was only an option for those who had already gotten a départ, or whose family members, within Guinea or abroad, could provide start-up funds. Others had to think of more creative entrepreneurial approaches.
Some enterprises that required little start-up capital could be surprisingly profitable. In Daande Caanguel, I got my daily water supply from Abdourahmane, a man in his mid-forties.
Working with about a dozen of his own plastic jerrycans and a cart, Abdourahmane spent his days ferrying water from the town pump to his regular customers. Abdourahmane would pour the water from two of his jerrycans into my own two personal jerrycans, empty from the previous day's use. I paid him the going rate of 500 FG per jerrycan. If he managed to deliver a hundred jerrycans of water a day, Abdourahmane made 50,000 FG ($7-$8). This worked out to be 1,500,000 FG (about $230) a month-more than the salaries of many government functionaries. Abdourahmane's work was distinguished from the manual labor performed by Guinean migrants in Dakar because Abdourahmane operated his own business rather than working for someone else. Nevertheless, the hard physical labor of carrying water for others did not appeal to most young, male Fulɓe as a business plan.
Cases like Abdourahmane's notwithstanding, most people did work that seemed hardly worth the effort, so small were the profits involved. A young married woman I knew in
Hamdallaye made snacks-tiny meatballs, fishballs, and beignets-to sell at the village's weekly market. With each item selling at 100 or 200 FG, she might bring in 35,000-37,000 FG ($5-$6) by the end of the day-barely more (and sometimes less) than she had spent on ingredients. One government functionary in Daande Caanguel supplemented his unreliable salary by selling mobile phone recharge cards. For every 92,000 FG (about $14) in recharge cards he sold, he got to keep 1,500 FG (less than $0.25). With lots of competitors selling the same cards, and with many customers buying cards in small, 1,000 FG and 2,000 FG increments, earning money this way was slow. In a good month, he might sell 4 million FG in recharge cards, earning about 65,000 FG (about $10) for himself. In months when local mobile phone coverage was spotty or nonexistent for several days at a time-not an uncommon event-he earned much less. Daouda, a high school student in Hamdallaye, occupied himself during his 2010 summer vacation by selling gasoline by the liter out of repurposed gin bottles. On the one hand, he could be sure of selling all the gas he acquired; inexpensive Chinese-manufactured motorbikes were increasingly popular even in rural areas, and the closest official gas station was in Labe, some twenty kilometers away. Daouda had two twenty-liter plastic jerrycans, which he would take to Labe and fill with gasoline at the station pump for the official price of 6,500 FG (about $1) per liter.
Back in Hamdallaye, Daouda would pour the gas from the jerrycans into individual liter bottles and display them by the side of the road, for sale at the local black market rate of 7,500 FG per liter. This was a profit of 20,000 FG (about $3) per jerrycan, 40,000 FG for both, but that profit was immediately halved if Daouda traveled to Labe to buy the gas himself-his seat in a shared taxi would cost 10,000 FG each way. Daouda got around this by commissioning taxi drivers traveling between Hamdallaye and Labe to take his empty jerrycans to the gas station and fill them for him, for a fee of 2,500 FG per jerrycan. Daouda estimated that he sold between four and six jerrycans-worth of gasoline in a month, clearing a profit of between 70,000 FG-105,000 FG ($10-$16) if he refrained from traveling to Labe at all himself. While this was not a bad summer income for a high school student who lived and ate with his family, Daouda would never have been able to support himself, let alone save for marriage or start building a house, relying on his gas money.
Small enterprises like these might appear irrational. People made only meager amounts of money, and sometimes even failed to break even, and yet persisted in this work. Why? Those who did otherwise-those who appeared to be sitting around and not working-could face widespread censure for failing to fulfill their responsibilities as adult persons. To "just sit"
(jooɗagol tun) was no good, Fouta Djallon residents told me on numerous occasions. Many, even most people operated on a middle ground between failure and success, doing more than just sitting around, but less than earning a living. People who never made what they considered a départ, or whose moments of financial prosperity had come and gone, nevertheless worked according to ideals not only of what was profitable, but of what was socially acceptable and laudable. If they could be seen to be working industriously, they could be seen as responsible persons, rather than as "incapable" (kelɗaa) or "useless" (hittaa).
This was especially the case for women, who rarely risked criticism from their families or the public by sitting around a teapot and not working. 13 Patrilocal marriage patterns in the Fouta Djallon meant that young married women often lived in households with their husbands' parents, brothers, and brothers' wives, where they were responsible for work including cooking, cleaning, gardening, and taking care of their own and others' children. In theory, a husband would give or send his wife regular sums of money to support the household, but this was contingent upon his earnings, which might be insufficient or sent infrequently. Consequently, women did not worry like men about getting a départ to afford marriage, but they incurred a number of expenses and obligations after marriage, often struggling to feed and clothe their children and send them to school, while also supporting aging parents. Activities like selling snacks at weekly market days might or might not enable women to meet some of these financial obligations, but they did allow women to demonstrate to their husbands' families and to their larger communities that they were working, and not "just sitting" around.
For both women and men in the Fouta Djallon, small-scale business efforts like selling market snacks, phone recharge cards, or gasoline by the liter demonstrated a sense of responsibility and personhood but yielded little to no profit. Often, these efforts were "informal,"
in that they were not registered with any government entity, followed no official regulations, and paid no taxes (cf. Hart 1973) . Outside traditional regulatory structures, informal economic activities may involve creativity and ingenuity, with people constantly on the lookout for entrepreneurial opportunities. Nevertheless, in Guinea and in other contexts of structural poverty, people can only afford to pursue business opportunities on a small scale; and those working at informal economic activities often survive only just barely, postponing rather than preventing total financial meltdown (cf. Hart 1973:79-81 ).
If they earned little money, however, people who engaged in small-scale, informal commerce showed their families and communities that they were responsible persons who worked hard to manage difficult living conditions as best they could. Under the structural constraints of poverty and underdevelopment, as well as the shared ideals that privileged entrepreneurship rather than manual labor or farming as acceptable work for Fulɓe, Fouta
Djallon residents endeavored not to be socially "useless" but rather to demonstrate their capability. Those who went abroad to seek their fortunes, meanwhile, through their absence avoided exposing themselves to accusations that they were "just sitting around" and not working. And yet, for many people, migration is an experience of disappointment. Dreams of making money to get a départ go unfulfilled, and instead of pursuing independent business ventures, migrants are often obligated to take up manual labor and other work they consider shameful.
Sometimes, they have little to do but "just sit" and drink tea, inactivity for which they would have been criticized at home. However, despite this disappointment, many people in the Fouta Djallon consider the best option for enduring poverty and insecurity at home to be seeking their fortunes-and thus their adult lives-abroad, even after multiple failures and setbacks.
At some level, the difficulties that Guineans and others confront in transnational migration can be read as a consequence of growing global inequalities and obstructions preventing the movement of people to and from certain areas of the world. Even as Guineans and migrants from many other countries have continued to see mobility as a way toward moneyearning and personal success, national borders have become increasingly policed in the name of nationalism and security (Fassin 2011) . Over the past decades, most citizens of African countries have benefited little from the flows of money, goods, and people supposed to be characteristic of neoliberalism, and restrictions have become increasingly tight on the movement of Africans into other world regions (Ferguson 2006 Guinean Fulɓe have told me, they are willing "to go anywhere." For entrepreneurs looking to do business, China and Dubai have become major hubs (cf. Haugen 2012 , Lyons et al. 2012 . For many would-be migrants, so-called "South-South" migration, especially movement from one African country to another, seems most promising (Whitehouse 2012) . In Angola, oil and diamond wealth have attracted much foreign investment and enriched a small percentage of the population, and Angola has consequently gained a reputation among Guineans as a place with dollars just waiting to be earned. And yet, for many Guineans, reaching African countries beyond the sub-region is nearly as difficult as getting to Europe or the U.S. I met men in Guinea who had braved the distance and expense of the journey to Angola only to be imprisoned and deported back to West Africa after their arrival. Migration to Senegal and other neighboring countries remains an option for Guineans intent to go abroad, but with persistent poverty in the wake of structural adjustment, recent and in some cases ongoing violent conflict, and, most recently, an Ebola epidemic, opportunities in the sub-region are limited. With the latitude to pursue their own survival strategies inhibited by global exclusions and structural inequalities, Guineans have been both participants in and victims of the supposed free markets and global flows of neoliberalism (cf. Han 2012 , Ong 2006 , Elyachar 2005 .
Clearly, adverse structural conditions play a significant role both in motivating economic migrants to leave their homes in the first place, and in constraining their chances of success abroad. However, by examining instances of failed or disappointed migration together with the kinds of time-consuming yet unprofitable work undertaken by non-migrants at home, a more nuanced picture emerges in which the search for money is closely interconnected with the search for respectable adult personhood. Migration from one poor country to another might seem economically irrational, and unprofitable entrepreneurial ventures might seem badly planned, but when examined together, these patterns become understandable as individual strategies for demonstrating one's capacity to become a responsible person. My Fulɓe interlocutors in Guinea and Senegal sought to become responsible persons and "leave a trace" in the world by marrying, building houses, and having children. Remittances are part of this ideal life trajectory, but they blend in with a host of other social expectations. Earning money abroad is important, and migrants consider themselves obligated to support their parents, siblings, and children financially by sending money home when they can. But adult women and men who never leave their hometowns express the same obligations to their kin, whether they are able to fulfill them by earning money or not. And when migrants do send money home, they are interested not only in supporting the daily lives or education of close relatives, but also in advancing their own personal futures as responsible adults who build houses, parent children, and support families.
Meanwhile, to prevent friends and neighbors from judging them useless and incapable, people living in their hometowns engage in small-scale entrepreneurial ventures that allow them to do little better than break even. Critical ethnographic studies have highlighted the importance of understanding migration not only in political and economic terms, but also as a social process that shapes selves, communities, and nations (e.g. Lindquist 2009 , Chu 2010 , Melly 2011 .
Examining instances of economically failed migration in juxtaposition with unprofitable business practices among non-migrants moves this discussion further beyond a focus on remittances as the intended object of migration and toward a more textured understanding of how apparent striving allows individuals to present themselves as responsible social persons, even in contexts where economic success seems unlikely.
Both at home and abroad, people living on the edge of survival work to achieve a semblance of respectable personhood. This can be a long and contingent process, as people remain on the lookout for any opportunity that could give them a start in life. Within days or weeks of my conversation with Alimou, Mamadou Korka, and the other young men around the teapot, some of them may have found work in Dakar, others may have found a way further abroad beyond Senegal, and still others probably returned to Guinea. Alpha Amadou, the palm oil vendor, returned to Guinea after only a few months in Senegal. The following year he went to Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, to try his luck again there. In 2012, still looking for a way forward, he moved to Conakry and, with $15,000 pooled from family members, traveled to Dubai to buy merchandise to sell back in Guinea. As long as he continued to seek his fortune according to the ideals he shared with others in his hometown, he could prevent-or at least postpone-not only economic failure but also a future of being considered an incapable, useless person. 7 "Pullo" is the singular of "Fulɓe," while "Pullo-Fouta" and "Fulɓe-Fouta" are terms by which Pular speakers from the Fouta Djallon frequently refer to themselves. 8 The willingness of Fulɓe migrants to do forms of labor abroad that they would have been ashamed to do at home is similar to the practices of West African migrants in other contexts (Newell 2012 : 68-73, Whitehouse 2012 .
9 A 2012 article in the news magazine Jeune Afrique profiles the activities of shoeshine boys in Conakry, most of whom are Pular speakers from the Fouta Djallon who come to the city to do menial (though entrepreneurial) work and live in humble conditions, with dreams of eventual grand success, modeling themselves on these same famously wealthy businessmen (Sow 2012) .
